Emotional intensity reduces later generalized anxiety disorder symptoms when fear of anxiety and negative problem-solving appraisal are low  by Sugiura, Yoshinori & Sugiura, Tomoko
lable at ScienceDirect
Behaviour Research and Therapy 71 (2015) 27e33Contents lists avaiBehaviour Research and Therapy
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/bratEmotional intensity reduces later generalized anxiety disorder
symptoms when fear of anxiety and negative problem-solving
appraisal are low
Yoshinori Sugiura a, *, Tomoko Sugiura a, b
a Graduate School of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University, Japan
b Graduate School of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University, The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japana r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 9 December 2014
Received in revised form
21 May 2015
Accepted 28 May 2015
Available online 29 May 2015
Keywords:
Emotional intensity
Generalized anxiety disorder
Worry
Fear of emotions
Problem solving
Moderator* Corresponding author. Graduate School of Integr
oshima University, 1-7-1, Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiros
ture 739-8521, Japan.
E-mail address: ysugiura@hiroshima-u.ac.jp (Y. Su
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2015.05.015
0005-7967/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elseviera b s t r a c t
While research based on the emotion dysregulation model indicates a positive relationship between
intense emotions and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms, emotion-focused intervention in-
volves the use of techniques to enhance emotional experiences, based on the notion that GAD patients
are engaging in avoidance strategies. To reveal the conditions under which intense emotions lead to
reduced GAD symptoms, we designed a longitudinal study to monitor changes in GAD symptoms among
students (N ¼ 129) over 3 months. Our focus was on possible moderators of the effect of emotional
intensity. Results indicated that when fear of emotions and negative appraisals about problem solving
were low, negative emotional intensity reduced later GAD symptoms. Moreover, under the condition of
high responsibility to continue thinking, emotional intensity tended to reduce later GAD symptoms.
Results suggest that reduced fear of emotions and reduced negative appraisals about problem solving
may enhance the use of emotional processing techniques (e.g., emotional exposure). The interaction
between responsibility to continue thinking and emotional intensity requires further examination.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is debilitating and difﬁcult
to treat, and is characterized by long-lasting, pervasive, and un-
controllable worrying (Andrews et al., 2010). Although there is
evidence supporting the efﬁcacy of cognitive behavioral therapy
(CBT) in treating GAD, there is room for improvement (for a meta-
analysis, see Cuijpers et al., 2014; Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey,
2013). Therefore, further understanding of the etiological process
is required, especially with regard to investigating mechanisms
related to emotions, because although techniques for enhancing
emotional processing are recommended in recent theories
(Borkovec & Sharpless, 2004; Mennin, 2006), there is considerable
theoretical debate over the function of worry and emotion in GAD,
whichmeans that the optimal target of exposure in treatment is not
always clear (Newman & Llera, 2011).ated Arts and Sciences, Hir-
hima City, Hiroshima Prefec-
giura).
Ltd. This is an open access article uThere are several theoretical models of GAD, many of which
postulate avoidance of emotions as being among the etiological
factors (Behar, DiMarco, Heckler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009). The
avoidancemodel developed by Borkovec, Alcaine, and Behar (2004)
considers worry as a maladaptive strategy used to suppress
emotional arousal via the mechanism of verbal-linguistic thoughts,
as opposed to imagery. The emotion dysregulation model of
Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, and Fresco (2005) aimed to extend the
avoidance model, proposing that the following four components of
emotion dysregulation lead to emotional avoidance in GAD:
heightened intensity of emotions, poor understanding of emotions,
negative appraisal of emotions, and lack of efﬁcient control over
emotions. Among these four factors, heightened intensity and lack
of control over emotions are especially strong predictors of GAD
(e.g., Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg, 2007; Mennin,
McLaughlin, & Flanagan, 2009; Stapinski, Abbott, & Rapee, 2010;
Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). This model led
to the development of emotion regulation therapy (Mennin, 2006),
wherein the focus is enhanced emotional awareness, skills training
for adaptive regulation, and emotional exposure.nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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with emotional avoidance
Emotion-focused intervention seeks to use intense emotions to
treat a problem that is related to intense emotions. Therefore, it is
important to clarify the contexts in which intense emotions
heighten or reduce GAD symptoms. Although cross-sectional evi-
dence has indicated that there is a link between emotional intensity
and GAD, the relationship between the two factors may be rather
complicated. Newman and Llera (2011) reviewed evidence indi-
cating that worrying does not dampen emotions but, contrary to
the expectation of avoidance theory, actually intensiﬁes them (e.g.,
McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007). Therefore, it is expected
that the cross-sectional evidence will reﬂect, at least in part, the
effect of continued worrying on intense emotions. On the other
hand, the application of emotional processing techniques (e.g.,
emotional exposure) for treating GAD considers that fully experi-
encing emotions without trying to avoid these leads to reduced
GAD symptoms (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Mennin, 2006). Even if
worrying does not reduce anxiety, GAD patients may still use
avoidance strategies (c.f., Newman & Llera, 2011). Therefore, when
avoidance attempts are reduced, increased emotional intensitymay
indicate successful emotional processing (Foa & Kozak, 1986), thus
reducing GAD symptoms.
Based on this reasoning, it is expected that emotional intensity
may reduce GAD symptoms under the following two conditions: (a)
if it is measured preceding GAD (longitudinally) and (b) if
emotional avoidance is low. If these conditions are not met, it may
be that emotional intensity is related to increased GAD symptoms,
as repeatedly found in previous cross-sectional studies (e.g.,
Mennin et al., 2007). To address this hypothesis, we examined the
longitudinal interactive predictive power of both emotional in-
tensity and emotional avoidance on GAD symptoms and worrying.
We measured fear of emotions as an index of emotional avoidance
(Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005).
2. Possible longitudinal interaction of emotional intensity
with problem solving
Although the chief moderator investigated in this study is
emotional avoidance, we also explored the interaction of emotional
intensity with appraisals about problem solving. This is based on
the initiationetermination (IeT) model of worrying (Berenbaum,
2010), which considers that deﬁcient problem solving is a major
factor in the continuation of worrying. The IeT model postulates
that perceived threats lead to initiation of worrying, and that a
prolonged worrying comes from lack of acceptance of the possi-
bility of threat when one feels that s/he has taken reasonable
concrete actions to achieve acceptance. This model indicates that
emotional avoidance and problem-solving conﬁdence work in
tandem to induce prolonged worrying. Low problem-solving con-
ﬁdence and emotional avoidance hinder the use of active strategies
to confront problems, thus preventing one from feeling a sense of
closure. For example, emotionally avoidant people may also avoid
problematic situations that tend to elicit emotions and distress
(e.g., interpersonal conﬂicts). Therefore, we explored how etiolog-
ical factors related to problem solving interact with emotional
intensity.
As the interaction of emotional intensity with problem-solving-
related factors is at the exploratory stage, it is difﬁcult to articulate
concrete hypotheses. However, it will be helpful to focus on the
aspects of appraisals about problem solving, which have been
demonstrated to be related to worrying and can be conceptually
tied to the IeT model. We chose the following two factors for this
purpose: the responsibility to continue thinking and low problem-solving conﬁdence. Both are measured using the Problem-Solving
Related Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (Sugiura, 2007). The re-
sponsibility to continue thinking is the belief that one needs to
engage in prolonged thinking about stressful problems. Low
problem-solving conﬁdence is closely related to negative problem
orientation (dysfunctional attitudes toward problem solving),
which has been shown to be related to GAD symptoms (e.g., Dugas
et al., 2007). The relation of both factors to worry/GAD symptoms
has been shown in previous studies, as detailed in the method
section. These factors are equivalent to those of the IeTmodel, with
the responsibility to continue thinking reﬂecting a perseverative
iterative styledanother factor that delays termination of worrying
in addition to inducing a reduced sense of closuredand low
problem-solving conﬁdence delaying termination of worrying by
hindering the active confrontation of problematic situations, as
discussed above.
3. Need for longitudinal study of GAD
Longitudinal prediction of GAD and worry has been recom-
mended but it remains a relatively understudied research area.
Hale, Klimstra, and Meeus (2010) followed adolescents for ﬁve
years and found a reciprocal relationship between worrying and
neuroticism, with a stronger effect from the former to the latter
rather than vice versa. Because emotional intensity is closely
related to neuroticism (Mennin et al., 2007), it is possible that the
cross-sectional correlation of emotional intensity with worrying
includes the effect of worrying on emotional intensity. Dugas,
Laugesen, and Bukowski (2012) followed adolescents for 5 years
and found a reciprocal relationship between intolerance of uncer-
tainty and fear of anxiety on one hand, and worry on the other.
Based on this ﬁnding, Dugas et al. recommended controlling for
symptom severity in examining etiological factors. It may not be
realistic to eliminate the possibility of worry affecting model vari-
ables; however, it is worth assessing whether model variables
predict worrying even after controlling for prior worrying.
4. The current study
The purpose of this study is to examine whether emotional in-
tensity can predict a later reduction in GAD symptoms. It was
predicted that if fear of emotions is low, increased emotional in-
tensity will be related to a reduction in GAD. This study also
explored problem solving-related metacognitions as a possible
moderator of this relationship.
5. Method
5.1. Participants and procedure
Japanese college students participated voluntarily, completing
questionnaires at two time points during classes. At Time 1, they
completed scales of model variables and symptoms, and symptom
measures were then repeated at Time 2 (about 3 months later).
Participants produced for themselves a conﬁdential six-digit
number used to match data at the two time points, while preser-
ving anonymity. The Time 1 questionnaire was completed by 173
participants (51% women; Mean age ¼ 19.29, SD ¼ 1.16), while that
at Time 2 was completed by 170 participants (61% women; Mean
age ¼ 19.39, SD ¼ 0.84). We matched data for 129 participants for
subsequent statistical analysis (59% women; Mean age ¼ 19.38,
SD ¼ 0.87). The institutional ethical review board approved the
study. The nature and purpose of the study were explained to
participants, who were told that they could choose not to take part.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and internal consistencies of study variables (N ¼ 129).
M SD a
EIS-NEG 51.02 7.82 0.80
EIS-POS 48.70 7.22 0.85
EIS total 99.72 12.75 0.86
ACS 160.68 36.60 0.95
RESP 41.91 10.28 0.87
LACK 48.57 13.01 0.90
GADQ-IV Time 1 4.36 2.88 0.83
GADQ-IV Time 2 4.16 2.60 0.81
PSWQ Time 1 43.11 17.75 0.92
PSWQ Time 2 39.66 17.39 0.93
Note. EIS ¼ Emotional Intensity Scale; ACS ¼ Affective Control Scale;
RESP ¼ Responsibility to continue thinking; LACK ¼ Lack of satisfaction with the
problem-solving process; GADQ-IV ¼ Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-
IV; PSWQ ¼ Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
1 Gender did not correlate with symptoms (r < 0.08; p > 0.32) and controlling for
this variable did not change patterns of following results. Therefore, we did not
include gender in the subsequent analyses.
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TheEmotional Intensity Scale (EIS; Bachorowski&Braaten,1994)
has 14 items for measuring positive and 16 items for measuring
negative emotional intensity. Each item has a stem depicting an
emotion-eliciting situation, followed by ﬁve statements indicating
graded levels of emotional intensity. It yields scores for positive and
negative subscales (EIS-POS and EIS-NEG), and the total scale (EIS
total). The original version indicated high internal consistency and
temporal stability. Total and negative scores were related to
neuroticism and, unlike positive and negative emotionality, EIS-POS
and EIS-NEG scores were positively correlated (Bachorowski &
Braaten, 1994). The Japanese EIS indicated a high Cronbach's alpha
reliability (a ¼ 0.81), with scores and interfactor correlations that
were comparable to those in the original version, and negative and
total scores that were correlated with trait anxiety, supporting its
validity (Noguchi, Sato, & Yoshikawa, 2008).
The Affective Control Scale (ACS; Williams, Chambless, &
Ahrens, 1997) contains 42 items that are rated on a 7-point Likert
scale, ranging from 1¼ strongly disagree to 7¼ strongly agree, and is
used to measure negative appraisals of the following four emo-
tions: fear, depression, anger, and positive emotions. The original
version has excellent internal consistency and temporal reliability
and predicted fear of experimentally induced bodily sensation. The
Japanese version has acceptable to good internal consistency
(a¼ 0.69e0.91), and the validity was indicated by correlations with
neuroticism, stress reactions, and avoidant coping scales
(Kanetsuki, Kanetsuki, & Oikawa, 2010).
The Problem-Solving Related Meta-Cognitions Scale (Sugiura,
2007) measures the appraisals that occur during a stressful
problem-solvingprocess,with anexclusive focuson those that lead to
prolonged worry. Participants rate how often these appraisals occur
while they are solving stressful problems, using a 5-point Likert scale
ranging from1 (none) to 5 (very frequent). This scale has the following
two factorially derived subscales: responsibility to continue thinking
(RESP), which is the belief that one needs to engage in prolonged
thinkingabout stressful problemsand ismeasuredwith14 items (e.g.,
“I should continue thinking until I ﬁnd better solutions” and “It is
irresponsible to stop thinking”); and lack of satisfaction with the
problem-solving process (LACK), which captures low problem-
solving conﬁdence using 19 items (e.g., “Things have never worked
out successfully for me” and “I don't know how to solve this prob-
lem”). Sugiura (2005, 2007) reported adequate internal reliability for
this instrument (a ¼ 0.86e0.90) and found that RESP was correlated
with perfectionism and active problem solving, while LACK was
correlated with other measures of poor problem-solving conﬁdence.
The incremental validity of RESP in predicting worry/GAD symptoms
has been reported by comparison to the following etiological factors:
metacognitive beliefs, intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem-
solving orientation, cognitive avoidance, fear of emotion, and expe-
riential avoidance (Sugiura, 2007; Sugiura & Sugiura, under review;
Sugiura, Sugiura, & Tanno, 2013). Sugiura (2004, 2005) found that
both RESP and LACK mediate the relationship between problem-
focused coping strategies and worry.
The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV;
Newman et al., 2002) measures DSM-IV GAD symptoms and can be
used both to compute dimensional symptom severity and to yield
dichotomous GAD status. This study used the dimensional scores.
The original version instructs participants to skip questions about
physical symptoms and distress, if one has not been bothered by
excessive and uncontrollable worrying more days than not in the
last six months. This speciﬁcation was removed for the present
study so that participants would rate all items, because our focus is
on the broad range of GAD symptom distribution (following
Roemer et al., 2009). Takebayashi, Takagaki, and Sugiura (2012)translated the GADQ-IV into Japanese and found the following
psychometric properties, which are comparable to those of the
original version: a one-factor structure, adequate internal reliability
(u ¼ 0.84), high correlation with worry and intolerance of uncer-
tainty, and a speciﬁc relation to worrying but not to social anxiety
after controlling for trait anxiety and depression. Although the
GADQ-IV instructs participants to rate two items in reference to the
past six months, we used the time frame of “recently” to capture
changes within the 3-month interval in which this study was
conducted. The high Cronbach's alphas across two occasions (0.83
and 0.81) and concurrent correlation with the PSWQ (0.75 and
0.79; p < 0.001) indicate acceptable preliminary psychometric
properties of the present adaptation of the GADQ-IV.
The 16-item Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer,
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) has excellent psychometric prop-
erties for measuring the frequency and intensity of worry. The Japa-
nese version (Sugiura& Tanno, 2000) has the following psychometric
properties, which are comparable to the original version. It showed
good internal consistency (a ¼ 0.92) and validity: a one-factor struc-
ture and a strong correlation with trait anxiety, forming different a
factor from that of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Because our
focus in this study is onchange inworrying,weusedmodiﬁed itemsof
the one-week version of the scale, developed by St€ober and
Bittencourt (1998), omitting one item, that is, “I've been a worrier all
my life,” rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 0 ¼ never to
6 ¼ almost always. The one-week version has demonstrated high in-
ternal consistency, convergence with another worry questionnaire,
and weekly improvements due to therapy (St€ober & Bittencourt,
1998). We asked participants to rate items in relation to how they
hadbeenrecently, in accordancewith theGADQ-IV.Thehighalphasof
the PSWQ across two occasions (0.92 and 0.93), concurrent correla-
tion with the GADQ-IV, and the expected zero-order concurrent cor-
relation with model variables (Table 2, left) indicate acceptable
preliminary psychometric properties of the present adaptation.6. Results
6.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Descriptive statistics of the study variables are shown in Table 1.
All scales exhibited good to excellent internal consistency
(a¼ 0.80e0.95). We ﬁrst examined the correlation between Time 1
predictors and symptoms (Table 2, left).1 EIS-NEG, EIS total, ACS,
Table 2
Zero-order (Time 1) and semi-partial (Time 2) correlations between GAD symptoms/
worry and model variables.
Time 1 symptomsa Time 2 symptoms
controlling for Time 1b
GADQ-IV PSWQ GADQ-IV PSWQ
EIS-NEG 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.03 0.06
EIS-POS 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.01
EIS total 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.04 0.03
ACS 0.66*** 0.73*** 0.20* 0.30***
RESP 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.05 0.11
LACK 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.09 0.27**
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Note. EIS ¼ Emotional Intensity Scale; ACS ¼ Affective Control Scale;
RESP ¼ Responsibility to continue thinking; LACK ¼ Lack of satisfaction with the
problem-solving process; GADQ-IV ¼ Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-
IV; PSWQ ¼ Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
a N ¼ 173.
b N ¼ 129.
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symptoms and worrying, consistent with previous cross-sectional
results (e.g., Mennin et al., 2007; Sugiura, 2007).
We also computed semi-partial correlations between resi-
dualized Time 2 symptoms, controlling for Time 1 scores and pre-
dictors (Table 2, right). ACS scores were related to both enhanced
GAD symptoms and worrying, while LACK scores were related
increased worrying. Other signiﬁcant semipartial correlations were
not found. None of the emotional intensity indices indicated semi-
partial correlations with residualized Time 2 symptoms; therefore,
their effects on later symptoms, if any, are not main effects.Fig. 1. The effect of emotional intensity on later GAD symptoms, as moderated by
emotional avoidance/problem-solving appraisal. Variables are mean-centered. (a) The
effect of negative emotional intensity on later GAD symptoms as moderated by fear of
emotions. (b) The effect of negative emotional intensity on later GAD symptoms as
moderated by negative appraisals about problem solving. (c) The effect of total
emotional intensity on later GAD symptoms moderated by responsibility to continue
thinking. EIS ¼ Emotional Intensity Scale; ACS ¼ Affective Control Scale;
RESP ¼ Responsibility to continue thinking; LACK ¼ Lack of satisfaction with the
problem-solving process; GADQ-IV ¼ Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV.6.2. Interactive effect of emotional intensity and cognitive factors on
GAD/Worry
To examine the longitudinal interactive predictive power of the
model variables, we conducted series of hierarchical regression
analyses, where scores on the PSWQ and GADQ-IV served as
dependent variables. Each regression includes one of the emotional
intensity indices (EIS-POS/EIS-NEG/EIS total) and one of three
moderators (ACS/LACK/RESP). Variables are mean centered to
enhance interpretation. A variance inﬂation factor greater than 2.28
was not observed, suggesting no multicollinearity. Predictors were
entered in a hierarchical manner, whereby Time 1 symptoms were
entered in step 1, main effect of emotional intensity and moderator
in step 2, and their interaction in step 3.
When predicting GADQ-IV scores, 56% of the variance in Time 2
GADQ-IV scores was predicted by Time 1 GADQ-IV scores. Signiﬁ-
cantmain/interaction effects were as follows: (a) themain effects of
EIS-NEG and ACS explained an additional 4% of the variance
(p < 0.01) and their interaction explained a further 2% (p < 0.05).
Main effects were derived from the positive relationship between
ACS scores and GAD symptoms (B ¼ 0.02; p < 0.01). (b) The main
effects of EIS-NEG and LACK were not signiﬁcant (DR2 < 0.01;
p ¼ 0.35) and their interaction explained a further 1% of the vari-
ance (p < 0.05). (c) The main effects of EIS total and ACS an
explained additional 5% of the variance (p < 0.01), while their
interaction did not approach signiﬁcance (DR2 < 0.05; p ¼ 0.21).
Main effects were derived from the positive relationship between
ACS and GAD symptoms (B¼ 0.02; p < 0.01). (d) The main effects of
EIS total and RESP were not signiﬁcant (DR2 < 0.01; p ¼ 0.71) and
their interaction explained a further 1% of the variance (p < 0.05).
Therefore, three interactions emerged. Simple slopes for the
three signiﬁcant interactions in predicting GAD symptoms were
probed using the method of Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2006).Fig. 1 depicts the effects of emotional intensity on GAD symptoms
where moderators are ±1.5 SD from means. (a) When ACS scores
were low (1.5 SD), EIS-NEG reduced GAD symptoms (B ¼ 0.09;
p < 0.01), while when ACS scores were high (þ1.5 SD), EIS-NEG had
no effect on GAD symptoms (B ¼ 0.01; p ¼ 0.67). (b) When LACK
scores were low (1.5 SD), EIS-NEG tended to reduce GAD symp-
toms (B ¼ 0.06; p < 0.10), while when LACK scores were high
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p¼ 0.15). (c)When RESP scores were high (þ1.5 SD), EIS total scores
tended to reduce GAD symptoms (B ¼ .04; p < 0.10), while under
low RESP scores (1.5 SD) these tended to increase GAD symptoms
(B ¼ 0.03; p < 0.10).
When predicting PSWQ scores, 57% of Time 2 PSWQ scores were
predicted by Time 1 PSWQ scores. No signiﬁcant interaction
emerged. In regressions involving ACS or LACK scores, signiﬁcant
main effects were observed (ACS: DR2 > 0.09; p < 0.01; LACK:
DR2 > 0.07; p < 0.01), driven by positive effects of ACS
(B¼ 0.09e.12; p < 0.001) or LACK scores (B¼ 0.23e.24; p < 0.01) on
worrying.
7. Discussion
We found that there was an interaction between negative
emotional intensity and fear of emotions in relation to GAD
symptoms. Speciﬁcally, when fear of emotions was low, negative
emotional intensity reduced GAD symptoms. Moreover, when
problem-solving conﬁdence was high, negative emotional intensity
tended to reduce GAD symptoms. Finally, total emotional intensity
interacted with responsibility; contrary to our expectation, under
high responsibility emotional intensity tended to reduce GAD
symptoms, while under low responsibility it tended to enhance
GAD symptoms. Interactions found in this study suggest that a
rationale focused on fear of emotions, and possibly on problem-
orientation training, may enhance the effect of emotional exposure.
Previous studies found that emotional intensity is a strong
positive predictor of GAD symptoms/worrying (Mennin et al., 2007,
2009). In fact, we found signiﬁcant positive zero-order correlations
between EIS-NEG/EIS total and GAD symptoms/worry at Time 1
(r ¼ 0.25e0.48; p < 0.0001). Contrary to these cross-sectional re-
lationships, negative emotional intensity reduced worrying 3
months later, at Time 2, when combined with reduced fear of
anxiety and reduced negative appraisals about problem solving
(trend). Mennin et al. (2009) argued that emotional intensity itself
is not pathological. In the present longitudinal design, the resultant
relationship indicates that experiencing intense emotions leads to a
subsequent reduction in GAD symptoms under certain
circumstances.
The present results can be understood in light of the notion that
emotional experiences lead to therapeutic change (Pascual-Leone&
Greenberg, 2007). Foa and Kozak (1986) considered emotional
reactivity to feared objects as a marker of emotional processing.
Newman and Llera (2011) found a lack of augmentation of CBT by
emotion processing techniques in a randomized controlled trial and
questioned the emphasis on interpersonal context and phenome-
nological experience of current techniques for enhancing
emotional processing, further suggesting the need to explore con-
ditions under which emotional processing is successful. Newman
and Llera (2011) recommended the more focused use of exposure
to sudden increases in emotion, based on their review (Newman,
Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 2013) and empirical
evidence (Llera & Newman, 2014) indicating that worry does not
suppress emotions but functions to avoid the impact of a sudden
increase in emotions by maintaining a sustained negative
emotional state.
This study may be considered to indicate further conditions
conducive to successful use of emotional experiences, speciﬁcally,
reduced fear of emotions and enhanced conﬁdence in problem
solving. The former is understandable as fear of emotions may
hinder fully experiencing those emotions, or enhance avoidance of
emotions, while the latter suggests that those with high conﬁdence
in problem solving will confront emotional experiences with
investigative attitudes. Negative appraisals of problem solving maybe partly related to difﬁculty with utilizing emotions in problem
solving. In line with this, Berenbaum (2010) expected a positive
relationship between emotional avoidance and a reduced tendency
to actively solve problems. From a life-span development
perspective, Lawton (2001) argued that emotions are intrusive for
immature people, while mature people consider emotions to be
informative. Although direct translation may be overstating, it is
possible that those with negative problem-solving attitudes cannot
beneﬁt (e.g., learn something) from intense emotions. However,
results pertaining to problem-solving conﬁdence need further
replication because a simple slopes analysis showed only an indi-
cation of a trend.
Moreover, the nature of emotional intensity measured here
suggests that there are further conditions that promote successful
emotional processing. Of studies in which positive relationships
were found between emotional intensity and GAD symptoms,
Mennin et al. (2005, 2007) used the Berkeley Expressivity Ques-
tionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1997), which emphasizes intense
expression, and then, in a later study (Mennin et al., 2009), used the
Affect Intensity Measure (AIM; Larsen & Diener, 1987). Although
the AIMwas ﬁrst conceived of as unidimensional index of intensity,
later studies found there were separate factors for reactivity
(strength of response to speciﬁc situations) and intensity (strength
of emotions once experienced), especially in regard to negative
emotions (Bryant, Yarnold, & Grimm, 1996). As EIS items are all
situation-speciﬁc, this scale may reﬂect emotional reactivity, and
situation-speciﬁc emotional reactions may represent differentiated
emotions. Emotion regulation therapy for GAD seeks to increase
differentiated emotions via thematic experiential exposure, in
which patients are asked to engage in various emotions and explore
the appraisals and beliefs about them that drive emotional avoid-
ance. It aims to integrate information from multiple sources
(emotional, contextual, and cognitive) to enable one to respond to
situations and events in accordance with one's personal goals and
values (Mennin, 2006). The importance of situational-speciﬁc items
in examining the negative relationship between emotional in-
tensity and GAD symptoms is consistent with the emphasis in
emotion regulation therapy on integrating information from mul-
tiple sources, including context. However, capturing the nuanced
relation between emotional intensity and psychopathology will
require systematic investigation of person, situation, strategy, and
goal dimensions (Aldao, 2013). Furthermore, self-reports of
emotional intensity in response to speciﬁc situations may require
certain level of awareness and clarity about emotions and contexts.
Therefore, it might have led to the detection of a negative relation
to GAD symptoms. Moreover, although the orthogonal nature of
positive and negative emotionality is well-documented (Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), the EIS-POS and EIS-NEG subscales indi-
cated substantial positive correlations with the present data
(r ¼ 0.43, p < 0.001). Therefore, EIS-NEG may represent the ability
to experience both positive and negative emotions, rather than an
inﬂexible adherence to negative emotions. Focusing on a multidi-
mensional measure of emotional intensity (reactivity, intensity,
expressivity, and valence) may further elucidate the distinction
between adaptive and maladaptive sides of emotional intensity.
Dividing emotional valence into ﬁner dimensions will also be
fruitful. McFatter (1998) found that there were differential per-
sonality correlates of anger-vs. non-anger-related negative
emotional intensity.
An unexpected ﬁnding was that, there was a trend toward EIS
total scores reducing GAD symptoms when responsibility to
continue thinking was high. Because RESP is thought to prolong
worrisome thinking, it was predicted to interfere with emotional
processing. One speculation is that the present results are driven by
positive emotional intensity. However, EIS-POS presented a trend
Y. Sugiura, T. Sugiura / Behaviour Research and Therapy 71 (2015) 27e3332toward interactionwith RESP (DR2¼ 0.01; p< 0.10), which is almost
the samemagnitude as that for EIS-NEG (DR2¼ 0.01; p < 0.10), with
similar conﬁgurations of simple slopes. Another possibility is that
the present results stem from the shared variance between RESP
and problem-focused coping (Sugiura, 2005). With regard to active
problem-focused attitudes, strong emotions can be adaptive;
however, the positive correlation between LACK and RESP (r¼ 0.49;
p < 0.0001) and previous ﬁndings that LACK mediated the effect of
the RESP on worrying (Sugiura, 2004) indicate that RESP is also
related to the negative orientation toward problem solving, thereby
making this interpretation unlikely.2 Finally, high responsibility
may lead to persistent confrontation to intense emotions. A treat-
ment study reported that comorbid obsessive-compulsive per-
sonality disorder enhanced treatment of obsessive-compulsive
disorder in the form of increased persistence in exposure home-
work (Gordon, 2009). Again, this needs further replication because
a simple slopes analysis showed only an indication of a trend.7.1. Limitations and future directions
The ﬁrst limitation of this study is the exclusive reliance on a
nonclinical population. However, continuity in the distribution of
worry has been empirically demonstrated (Olatunji, Broman-Fulks,
Bergman, Green, & Zlomke, 2010). Second, we relied on self-report
measures. As, Kerns, Mennin, Farach, and Nocera (2014) demon-
strated, assessing reduced emotion regulation ability among those
with GAD using performance and behavioral measures will be
informative. Third, a more differentiated measure of emotional
intensity is required, as discussed above. Fourth, given the chronic
course of GAD and worrying, it is important to examine longer time
intervals. Fifth, although signiﬁcant interactions were found with
regard to problem-solving-related appraisals, a simple slopes
analysis at ±1.5 SD from themeans of themoderators indicated that
we should be cautious in interpreting these results. Sixth, although
this study used recent versions of the PSWQ/GADQ-IV to capture
changes, using newmethodsmay have been aweakness due to lack
of compilation of validity evidence. In addition, PSWQ scores were
relatively low. However, our participants' GADQ-IV scores (see
Table 1) were at the same level reported in Takebayashi et al. (2012;
M ¼ 4.12 SD ¼ 2.63). In addition, the use of items based on widely
used measures will lend some conﬁdence in the present results.
Nonetheless, future studies might use a more focused time frame
than “recently.” Seventh, the relationships among the present set of
predictors and other psychopathologies deserve consideration
because repetitive thoughts are considered to be transdiagnostic
etiological factors (Ehring &Watkins, 2008). Finally, future studies
may try a prediction of symptoms over a longer period of time.Conﬂict of interest declaration
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